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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A FINAL, 
ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT THAT RESOLVED 
THE LITIGATION. 
This Court should reverse the trial court· s order, which wrongfully enforces 
the Mediation Agreement as a final, enforceable settlement agreement. The 
express language of the Mediation Agreement makes any final settlement "subject 
to" the future drafting of a mutually acceptable final settlement agreement 
containing the terms of the Mediation Agreement and a to-be-negotiated non-
disparagement clause, as well as new GYN and Spearhead agreements. And 
dismissal of the lawsuit is not to occur until after execution of those final 
agreements. Under these circumstances, essential, material terms of a final 
settlement are lacking, or at minimum, the Mediation Agreement is insufficiently 
definite as a matter of la\v. The trial cou1t's conclusions to the contrary vvere 
incorrect. 
A Correctness Standard of Review Applies to This Appeal. 
Based on the specific circumstances of this case, the Court should apply a 
correctness standard in rev ievving this appeal. l n John Deere Co. "· A & H 
Equipment. Inc.~ this Court held that ~-whether a contract exists between parties is a 
question or lmv \vhich ,ve revii:~,v for correctness.:, 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994 ): see olso Carter,'. Sorens011, 2004 L:T 33, ~f 6, 90 P.3d 617 ('"\Ve 
determine the existence of a contract such as an option agreement, by resorting to 
principles of law; therefore, we grant no deference to the trial court that originally 
decided the matter."); Herrn Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether a contract exists between pa1iies is a question of 
law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion oflaw under a correction of 
error standard."). As here, that case involved a trial court's decision "to enforce [a] 
settlement agreement" and the trial court's conclusion that the parties "had a 
meeting of the minds." John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883. Considering these 
specific issues, the court identified that a correctness standard is the appropriate 
standard of review. Id. ("As to these issues, whether a contract exists between 
parties is a question of law which we review for correctness.") ( emphasis 
supplied). Because the same issues that were dealt with in John Deere Co. are 
being reviewed in this case, the correctness standard should be applied. 
Patterson argues ,vithout explanation or analysis that the Court should apply 
a clear error standard, citing only LD 111,. LLC v. BBRD! LLC, but in that case, 
where there was admissible factual material regarding the formation of a settlement 
agreement outside of the settlement agreement itselt~ the Court properly held that 
·"[t]he [underlying] issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions 
of law and fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised.~' 2009 UT App 301, 
ilil 3--5, 13,221 P.3d 867 (quoting Cal Wadnvorth Constr. v. Cit_v (!{St. George, 
') 
865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Under the particular circumstances of 
that case, factual findings were appropriate on the material outside of the written 
agreement. See id. 
The instant case is different. Here, there is no admissible record evidence 
regarding the circumstances of any agreement outside of the four comers of the 
Mediation Agreement itself. As acknowledged by both parties, the Mediation 
Agreement was negotiated and executed entirely within the confidential, closed 
context of a mediation. Under the Utah Uniform Mediation Act, "a mediation 
communication is privileged ... and is not subject to discovery or admissible in 
evidence.', Utah Code § 78B-l 0-104( 1 ). Mediation communication is defined as 
"conduct or a statement~ whether oral, in a record, verbal, or nonverbal, that occurs 
during mediation." Utah Code § 78B-l 0-102(2). The only matter from a 
mediation that can be disclosed and admitted is a mediation communication "that 
is in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all patties to the agreement.'~ 
Utah Code § 78B-10-106( l )(a). Accordingly, in this case, the only admissible 
record evidence that can be used to determine whether the parties had a meeting of 
the minds is \vhat is found in the four corners of the Mediation Agreement. 
Importantly., under Utah lavv~ in determining whether the parties created an 
enforceable contract, courts are required to "'first 'look to the writing itself to 
ascertain the parties' intentions_ .. ,~ Lebrecht v. Deep Blue Pools and Spas Inc.~ 
..., 
_) 
2016 UT App 110, ~ 14, - P .3d - ( citations omitted); see also John Call Eng 'g, 
Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987) C[T]he intentions of 
the parties to a contract are controlling, and generally those intentions will be 
found in the instrument itself.") ( emphasis supplied); LDS Hosp. v. Capitol L{fe 
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) ("The interpretation of a written contract 
may be a question of law determined by the words in the agreement. In this 
regard, we recently stated that a cardinal rule in construing the contract is to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, these intentions should be 
gleaned from examination of the text of the contract itself."). Where an appellate 
court is "in as good a position as the trial court" to examine the settlement 
agreement and any admissible evidence that was available to the trial court, it 
"owe[s] the trial comi no deference." Lebrecht, 2016 UT App 110 at ,r 10. 
Here, the only admissible and relevant evidence that can be considered to 
determine whether the pa1iies had a meeting of the minds as to all essential terms 
of the agreement is the language of the Mediation Agreement itself. With no 
extrinsic evidence, the Comi is in as good of a position as the trial court to interpret 
the Mediation Agreement and the Court can do so as a matter of law. 
Patterson incorrectly argues that the Knights have failed to marshal the 
evidence without explaining what "findings" the trial court made that require 
evidence marshaling. Where there was no extrinsic evidence for the trial court to 
4 
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consider, there was no need below to present evidence and make findings. Indeed, 
the trial court based its decision on the terms of the rvlediation Agreement [ Add. A 
at 0552-56], and properly held that it could not consider any other facts such as the 
patties' discussions during mediation because such evidence is privileged. [Id. at 
0555-56.] Accordingly, there was no evidentiary hearing, no extrinsic evidence, 
and no factual finding, and on appeal, nothing to marshal. 1 
Neve1theless, even if marshaling was required, the Knights have sufficiently 
marshaled evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has "'repudiate[ d] the default notion 
of marshaling sometimes put forward in our cases and reaffirm[ ed] the traditional 
principle of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of 
persuasion." 1Vielsen, 2014 UT 10 at~ 41. The focus of the com1 is aon the merits, 
not on some arguable deficiency in the appellant's duty of marshaling." Id. at iI 42. 
Thus, an appellant is not required to play '"devil's advocate' and ... present[] 
·every scrap of competent evidence· in a ·comprehensive and fastidious order.''' 
Id at~ 43 (citations omitted). Because the Knights attached the Mediation 
Agreement in its entirety as an addendum to their opening brief, the marshaling 
requirement is satisfied. This ,vas the sole relevant, admissible evidence below. 
1 Marshaling is ··part oCthe overall burden n1.:cessary Lo meet the clear error 
standard of revie\:v on appeal.~- Stare v. Nielsen. 2014 CT l 0, ,r 36, 326 P.3d 645. 
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Patterson seemingly tries to argue that the allegations of his complaint and 
representations of his counsel at oral argument constitute evidence that the trial 
court could have considered in making its decision below. Patterson Brief at 18-
20, 24-25. However, neither allegations nor representations of counsel constitute 
evidence. See, e.g., Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404,274 P. 856,860 (1929) 
(finding that "allegations are not even evidence, much less proof of the fact"); 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991) (upholding trial 
court's jury instruction that stated, among other things, that "allegations are not 
evidence, but are merely the extent of the plaintiff's claims, and must not be 
considered by you as evidence in the case"); Wilson v. IHC Hasps., Inc., 2012 UT 
43, ,r 141 n.9, 289 P.3d 369 ("Attorney statements are not generally admissible as 
evidence.") ( citations omitted); Butterfield on Beha(lofButterfield v. Okubo, 790 
P .2d 94, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev 'don other grounds sub nom. Butte,jield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992) ("The representations of counsel, though entirely 
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence .... "). Since the 
Mediation Agreement is the only evidence that can be considered by the Court, the 
correctness standard is the appropriate standard of review for this appeal. 
t:... 
V 
B. The Trial Court Incorrectly Concluded That the Parties Reached 
a Meeting of the Minds on the Essential Terms of a Binding 
Settlement Agreement. 
The Cou11 should overturn the trial cou11' s decision to enforce the lVlediation 
Agreement as a binding settlement agreement because, as a matter of law, the 
patties never reached a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of an 
agreement. The "'"burden of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all 
material terms and conditions is on the party claiming there is a contract."' Bybee 
v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ,i 8, 189 P.3d 40 (quoting Cal Wadsworth Const,,·., 898 
P.2d at 13 76 ); see also Sack/er v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah 1995) (""[T]he 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that an offer and acceptance were more 
probable than not.''). The pa11ies agree that an enforceable settlement agreement 
requires a meeting of the minds on the essential or material terms, and terms that 
are sufficiently definite to be enforced. Patterson Brief at 1 7 ( citing LD Ill, 2009 
UT App 301 at ,r 14 ); Knights Brief at 9-10. It is true that ··[\v]hether or not [ a 
term is] essential to the contract requires an examination of the entire agreement 
and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into." Cessna Fin. 
'-' 
Corp. ,·. 1\1eyer, 575 P.2d I 048~ I 050 (Utah 1978); Patterson Brief at 17: Knights 
Brief at 12. But as shown above. in the present case the '"circumstances'· of the 
agreement were a privileged mediation, leaving the Court only the four corners of 
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the written Mediation Agreement to determine whether all essential terms have 
been agreed upon. 
Moreover, as addressed in the Knights' brief but ignored by Patterson, an 
agreement, including a settlement agreement, is not binding if the parties intended 
to leave an essential term open for future consideration or further negotiation. See 
Knights Brief at 10-12 (citing Prince, Yeates & Ge/dzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 
~ 17, 94 P.3d 179; 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Weigner, 2005 UT App 523, ,I 7, 127 
P.3d 1241 ). Such an agreement is refeITed to as an "agreement to agree" and is 
"generally unenforceable." Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 
1979). 
The terms of the agreement "are to be interpreted in accordance with their 
usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions." Nielsen v. 0 'Reiflv, 
848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah I 992). In this examination, ~"the ordinary and usual 
meaning of the words used is given effect,' \-vhich 'ordinary meaning ... is often 
best determined through standard, non-legal dictionaries."' S. Ridge Homeowners' 
Ass 'n v. Brown, 2010 UT App 23, ~ 1,226 P.3d 758 (quoting Warburton v. 
Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). 
Utah courts are to "·'look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids 
rendering any provision meaningless.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
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As detailed extensively below·, by examining the entire rvtediation 
Agreement, and attempting to harmonize its provisions, the Court should conclude 
that the patties did not have a meeting of the minds regarding the essential terms of 
a new agreement with Spearhead, a new agreement with GYN, and a mutually 
acceptable settlement agreement containing a to-be-negotiated mutual non-
disparagement clause. Based on those missing material terms, there was no 
enforceable agreement. 
1. The References to the Spearhead Agree111ent, Gl'N 
Agreement, a11d 1l1utua/ Non-Disparage1ne11t Clause 
Indicate That lVo Contract J,Jlas Formed. 
Reversal is warranted because the language of the IVlediation Agreement, 
when read as a whole in an effmt to harmonize its provisions, shows that the 
patties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of a binding 
settlement agreement. For example, paragraph 8 of the IVIediation Agreement 
states that the I'Vlediation Agreement is ~-[ s ]ubject to [ d]rafting 111 utual ly accept.able 
settlement agreement w/ above provisions and mutual non-disparagement and 
NE\V GYN & Spearhead [aJgreernents.'' [Add. Bat il 8.] According to the 
l'vlerriam- \Vebster dictionary, ··subject to'' means "dependent on something dsc to 
happen or be true.~· Dejinition c~( ··sul?iect to.'' rnerriam-webster.com, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to (last visited July 21, 
~~O 16 ). \\/here t.he r\,1ediation Agreement. '"depends on-~ the draning of a mutual I), 
9 
acceptable settlement agreement that includes a mutual non-disparagement clause 
and new GYN and Spearhead agreements, there can be no dispute that these terms 
were essential to any settlement agreement. But due to the fact that the terms of 
the mutual non-disparagement clause and GYN and Spearhead agreements are 
missing from the Mediation Agreement, there is nothing more than an agreement 
to agree, and no meeting of the minds on the essential terms of a contract. 
Next, paragraph 9 of the Mediation Agreement provides that "upon 
execution of [fJinal settlement documents and new GYN and [n]ev-l Spearhead 
[a]grmt. [p]arties will [fJile a [s]tipulated [m]otion and [o]rder to [d]ismiss 
litigation w/ prejudice." [Add.Bat 19.] Tellingly, this paragraph's separate 
reference to "final settlement documents'' and new G YN and Spearhead 
agreements evidences the parties' intent that the new GYN and Spearhead 
agreement are not simply an appendage of a settlement agreement as Patterson and 
the trial couit seem to suggest. Instead, the negotiation, drafting, and execution of 
each document would still be needed to accomplish the overarching purpose of any 
settlement agreement, which is to settle and resolve the lawsuit. Without these 
documents, the Mediation Agreement is merely an agreement to agree. 
Patterson argues that the Mediation Agreement contains all of the essential 
terms of the parties' settlement, but then only goes on to analyze the terms of the 
10 
first seven paragraphs,:2 without attempting to show how the remaining paragraphs 
relate to and \Vork ,vith those other terms. Patterson Brief at I 9-20. Patterson's 
exercise of reading paragraphs 8 and 9 out of the document is not an examination 
of the entire agreement, does not harmonize all of the terms, and does not interpret 
the plain language of the entire agreement. 
It is insufficient for Patterson to argue that paragraphs 8 and 9 of the 
Mediation Agreement were not essential on the premise that settlement agreements 
are "enforceable even when the parties expect to put the terms in a more formal 
document.'' [Add. A at 0553-54.] This argument falls sho11 for the same reasons 
as the trial courf s conclusion that the Mediation Agreement "contemplates ( 1) that 
the parties will take the handwritten [Ivlediation] Agreement and formalize it in a 
written formac and (2) the pai1ies will amend the existing agreements to include 
the provisions set fo11h in the [Mediation] Agreement." [Id. at 5 53.] While true 
that the "mutually acceptable settlement agreemenf' ,vould be drafted ''w/ [the I 
above provisions'' [Add. B. at i1 8]. the Mediation Agreement does not explain at 
all what terms would be included in the "'NEW GYN & Spearhead [a]greements,' 
or the ··mutual non-disparagement'· clause. [Id. at il 8.] 
-----------
2 As to paragraphs 3 to 7, Patterson only slates that they "'also fit the bill and are 
sufficiently definite because they are capable of being enforced.'' Patterson Brief 
at 20. 
1 l 
Patterson also cannot resolve the omission in the Mediation Agreement of 
the terms of the "NEW GYN & Spearhead [a]greements" and the "mutual non-
disparagement" clause. [Id.] Where the Mediation Agreement is silent, Patterson 
can only resort to his complaint and the statements of his counsel, neither of which 
is evidence that can fill a gap in the Mediation Agreement. Patterson Brief at 22-
23. First, just because "the crux of' Patterson's underlying complaint was his 
"claim that the Knights breached the parties' JV Agreement by failing to pay 
Patterson his fifty-percent share of the Spearhead commissions" does not mean that 
this ,vas the only issue that the paiiies were seeking to resolve during the course of 
their mediation negotiations. Patterson Brief at 23. Indeed, it is common for 
patiies seeking to settle a lawsuit to, as a part of their settlement, resolve other 
issues that were not pled as claims or counterclaims in the lawsuit. As addressed 
above, without admissible evidence of the mediation discussions, the parties are 
left with the Mediation Agreement itself. 
Second, Patterson cannot say that the Mediation Agreement's silence about 
the terms of the new Spearhead and GYN agreements evidences that no terms were 
required by the parties. This circular argument lacks any evidentiary supp011, 
effectively renders meaningless the requirement that there be new Spearhead and 
GYN agreements, and only supports a finding that the Mediation Agreement is not 
a binding settlement agreement because it fails to specify the terms of the new 
12 
agreements. The finalization of the nevv agreements is a condition of the 
Mediation Agreement. 
Finally, relying entirely on the statements of his counsel made at oral 
argument below, Patterson argues that the Mediation Agreement only required that 
the new Spearhead and GYN agreements incorporate the provisions of the 
l\1ediation Agreement. Patterson Brief at 23-24 (citing statements of counsel at 
oral argument that old and new Spearhead agreements were "virtually identical"). 
Such statements are not evidence, should not have been relied on by the trial court, 
and cannot be relied upon by this Com1. See, e.g., fVilson, 2012 UT 43 at~ 141 n.9 
CAttorney statements are not generally admissible as evidence.") ( citations 
omitted); Butte,:fie!d on Beha((ofButte1:fleld, 790 P.2d at 96 ("The representations 
of counsel, though entirely credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence 
.... "). Outside of the incorrect statements of Patterson's counsel, which are not 
evidence, Patterson has identi tied no evidence to suggest that the ne,v Spearhead 
and GYN agreements only incorporated the provisions of the Mediation 
Agreement. The Mediation Agreement is simply silent about the new agreements' 
terms. Under these circumstances, material terms are missing and the trial court's 
ruling otherwise should be reversed. 
2. T/Je Non-Disparage1nept Provision Required by the 
1}1/cdiation Agreement Is an Essential Term. 
The trial cou1t also erred by failing to find that the provisions of the mutual 
non-disparagement provision to be included in the eventual settlement agreement 
were essential terms omitted from the Mediation Agreement. As the Knights 
demonstrated in their opening brief, it is not unprecedented for a court to hold that 
a non-disparagement clause is an essential term of a contract. Knights Brief at 18-
19 ( citing 1-ligbee v. Senhy Insurance Co., 25 3 F .3d 994 (7th Cir. 200 I). ln 
Higbee, the court recognized the non-disparagement clause as an essential term of 
the patties' settlement agreement based on an examination of the circumstances of 
the negotiations betv..1een the patties, and specifically evidence that one party 
"made it clear that she would not settle the case without such a clause." Higbee, 
253 F.3d at 998. Because the non-disparagement clause was an essential term to 
the parties' settlement agreement and the paities did little more than agree that ''the 
settlement agreement would contain a ... non-disparagement clause," the court 
held ''too much was left unresolved" to find the existence of a binding settlement 
agreement. Id. 
Although there is no admissible evidence available to the Court to determine 
whether the Knights, like the party in Higbee, made it clear in negotiating the 
Mediation Agreement that they would not settle the case without a non-
disparagement clause, it is undeniable from the face of the Mediation Agreement 
14 
that settlement was "'subject to'' or dependent on drafting a mutual non-
disparagement clause. [Add. B at~ 8~ Point (I )(B )( 1 ), above.] This language, as in 
Higbee, is sufficient to show that the mutual non-disparagement clause \Vas 
essential and without its specific terms, which were deferred, the Mediation 
Agreement is too indefinite to be enforced. 
Patterson mistakenly argues that the Knights cannot raise this issue on 
appeal because it was not preserved below. Under Utah law, an issue is preserved 
for appeal if it is '"'raised in the trial court such that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on the issue.'~ Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ~ 26, 158 P.3d 
540 (citing Spears v. H'arr, 2002 UT 24, ill L 44 P.3d 742). The Knights did this, 
raising below multiple times the argument that the terms of the mutual non-
disparagement provision were essential and never agreed upon. 3 Patterson also 
3 [363-365 (memorandum opposing Patterson's motion to Ii ft stipulated stay and 
to enforce settlement) (providing legal basis for argument and arguing·'[ t]hese 
·future negotiations to be had' regarding the Settlement Proposal, a non-
disparagement agreement, the Spearhead Agreement and the GYN agreement, 
demonstrate that the Settlement Proposal is just that-a proposal.")]~ [618 (oral 
argument) (Counsel for the Knights: "'"\VelL I think it's clean-iCs really well-
ifs clean. Just-and I think it includes ,vhat the deal is here because \vhat you 
reallv see is that it does not have the binding langua2.e in it, and then it goes on-
.,J ,__, .__. '- ._. 
clearly at paragraph eight and nine besides not indicating it's binding, indicates at 
Paragraph eight and nine subject to drafting mutually agreeable settlement 
agreement with above provisions, and mutual non-disparagement, and--I ~m going 
to get to this in a minute but most jmportant--a nc\v Got Your Number and 
Spearhead agreements. And that language. \vhen you realJy understand what \h/as 
going on in this mediation, whaf sin their minds, is the language that totally 
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addressed this issue, responding to the arguments raised by the Knights.4 Where 
both parties raised and addressed this issue, it cannot be argued that the trial cowi 
lacked an opportunity to rule on the issue. 
Patterson also mistakenly argues that the Knights have not presented any 
evidence showing that the terms of the mutual non-disparagement provision were 
essential to the parties' settlement. Patterson Brief at 2 7. As demonstrated above, 
as well as in the Knight's opening brief,5 the evidence showing that the terms of 
the mutual non-disparagement provision were essential to the parties' settlement is 
the language of the Mediation Agreement itself, which makes the Mediation 
Agreement ''subject to" or conditioned on the drafting of a mutual non-
disparagement clause. It was not for Patterson or the trial comt to second guess 
this language. The parties never reached a meeting of the minds on all of the 
essential terms of a binding settlement agreement, which necessitates reversal. 
throws out this idea that it's a completed essential terms that are binding in this 
agreement.").] 
4 [ 441 (''The additional general provisions identified-confidentiality, non-
disparagement, right of assignment, exclusivity, allocation of expenses to 
Spearhead, non-disclosures, non-competition, non-solicitation, and executive 
placement--are not material terms of a settlement.").] 
5 Knights Brief at 1 7. 
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C. It Would Be Irrational and Impracticable to Enforce the 
I\tlediation Agreement as a Binding Settlement Agreement. 
The Court should also overturn the trial court's order because it would be 
irrational and impracticable to leave the parties with only the Mediation Agreement 
as their governing settlement agreement. This result from below simply makes no 
logical sense as was alluded to by the trial court. The Mediation Agreement, as 
drafted, does not provide a means to accomplish its overarching purpose, which is 
to resolve and dismiss the underlying lawsuit. 
The trial court plainly acknowledged this problem, warning Patterson at oral 
argument: ··I don't know what you are going to do. You may have a resolution 
here, but how are you going to enforce [the Mediation Agreement] \vithout a bunch 
more Ii tigati on?" [ 664.] The trial court further asked Patters011, s counse I, 
"[A]ren't you creating more problems for your own client if you proceed under the 
handwritten agreement? ... I'm almost wondering \vhy you're in here in court 
today seeking to enforce this settlement agreement.~~ [668---69.] 
Patterson has not and cannot answer these questions, but instead opines, 
\Vithout analvsis, that ··the Mediation AgreemenCs essential terms are sufficientlv 
. ~ . 
definite as to be capable of being enforced because they provide a basis for 
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.~· 
Patterson Brief al :w. This simply is untrue. The ~"-1ediation Agreement is not 
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sufficiently definite to fulfil! its overarching purpose of settling and dismissing the 
underlying case. 
As the trial coutt made clear, another litigation or mediation will be needed 
to resolve the omission of nondisparagement terms, to negotiate and put in place a 
new GYN agreement, and to negotiate and procure with Spearhead a new 
Spearhead agreement. Dismissal by the trial court was not supposed to occur until 
the parties' dispute was fully resolved, as the Mediation Agreement itself says. 
[Add. B at~ 9.] By dismissing the case, the trial court has only set the parties up 
for further litigation. Until the essential missing terms are supplied, the status quo 
of the Mediation Agreement will be ineffective to meet its purpose of resolving the 
dispute between the parties. Under these circumstances, enforcing the Mediation 
Agreement as a final, binding settlement agreement would be irrational and 
impracticable. Reversal is therefore appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Knights respectfully request that the Court 
reverse the trial cowt's legal conclusion that the Mediation Agreement-standing 
alone-was a binding and enforceable settlement agreement, and in turn reverse 
the trial coutt's ruling dismissing this action with prejudice, and remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016. 
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